Game Theory II
Informacje ogólne
| Kod przedmiotu: | 221971-D |
| Kod Erasmus / ISCED: | (brak danych) / (brak danych) |
| Nazwa przedmiotu: | Game Theory II |
| Jednostka: | Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie |
| Grupy: |
Major courses for QEM - masters Przedmioty kierunkowe do wyboru SMMD-EKO Przedmioty obowiązkowe na programie SMMD-EKO |
| Punkty ECTS i inne: |
5.00 (zmienne w czasie)
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| Język prowadzenia: | angielski |
| Efekty uczenia się: |
Wiedza: Students know both classic and modern game theory models. Students can understand the role of information and uncertainty in the game. Students know the role of game theory in an analysis of socioeconomic phenomena and its limitations. Umiejętności: The student can describe simple and complex socio-economic problems in game-theoretic terms, including defining players, strategies, and the information available to individual players. The student can apply game-theoretic models in making and analyzing economic, political, and social decisions. The student can clearly, logically, and precisely formulate arguments related to game-theoretic analyses. The student can determine equilibria in games and select them based on learned criteria. Kompetencje społeczne: The student demonstrates a willingness to clearly communicate the concepts and results of game-theoretic analyses to those without a background in economics. The student is aware of the importance of game-theoretic methods in analyzing economic phenomena and the responsibility associated with their application. The student appreciates the importance of systematic, independent work in the process of acquiring knowledge and developing analytical skills. |
Zajęcia w cyklu "Semestr letni 2025/26" (w trakcie)
| Okres: | 2026-02-21 - 2026-09-30 |
Przejdź do planu
PN WT ŚR CZ WYK
CW
PT |
| Typ zajęć: |
Ćwiczenia, 15 godzin
Wykład, 30 godzin
|
|
| Koordynatorzy: | (brak danych) | |
| Prowadzący grup: | Joanna Franaszek | |
| Lista studentów: | (nie masz dostępu) | |
| Zaliczenie: |
Przedmiot -
Ocena
Wykład - Ocena |
|
| Skrócony opis: |
See the detailed program. The final program would be a selection of the topics listed. |
|
| Pełny opis: |
The aim of the course is to provide a comprehensive overview of classic and modern game theory. The course is a mix of examples and formal reasoning and would allow to develop both the intuition behind game-theoretic models and the analytical methods used in economics. |
|
| Literatura: |
Literatura podstawowa: 1. M.Osborne, A.Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1994. 2. Fudenberg, D., J. Tirole, Game theory. MIT Press, Cambridge 2002. Literatura uzupełniająca: 1. R.Myerson, Game Theory. Analysis of Conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1991; 2. Daalgard P., Introductory Statistics with R: Springer, 2008. 3. Maschler, M., E. Solan, S. Zamir, Game Theory. Cambridge University Press 2013. 4. Robert Aumann Lectures on Game Theory, Underground Classics in Economics, Westview Press, Boulder, 1989 5. Binmore, Ken. Playing for Real: A Text on Game Theory, 2007. 6. Krishna, Vijay. Auction theory. Academic press, 2009. 7. Crawford V., J. Sobel, "Strategic Information Transmission", Econometrica, 1982. 8. Kamenica E., M. Gentzkow, "Bayesian Persuasion", American Economic Review, 2011. |
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| Uwagi: |
Evaluation criteria Traditional Written Exam (written assignment (open questions)): 60.00% Multiple Choice Test: 0.00% Oral Exam: 0.00% Test: 0.00% Other (homeworks - problem sets): 40.00% The threshold percentage of absences (excluding lectures) defined as the proportion of class hours beyond which the achievement of learning outcomes is deemed unattainable: 50% |
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Zajęcia w cyklu "Semestr zimowy 2025/26" (zakończony)
| Okres: | 2025-10-01 - 2026-02-20 |
Przejdź do planu
PN WT ŚR CZ PT |
| Typ zajęć: |
Ćwiczenia, 15 godzin
Wykład, 30 godzin
|
|
| Koordynatorzy: | (brak danych) | |
| Prowadzący grup: | (brak danych) | |
| Lista studentów: | (nie masz dostępu) | |
| Zaliczenie: |
Przedmiot -
Ocena
Wykład - Ocena |
|
| Skrócony opis: |
See the detailed program. The final program would be a selection of the topics listed. |
|
| Pełny opis: |
The aim of the course is to provide a comprehensive overview of classic and modern game theory. The course is a mix of examples and formal reasoning and would allow to develop both the intuition behind game-theoretic models and the analytical methods used in economics. |
|
| Literatura: |
Literatura podstawowa: 1. M.Osborne, A.Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1994. 2. Fudenberg, D., J. Tirole, Game theory. MIT Press, Cambridge 2002. Literatura uzupełniająca: 1. R.Myerson, Game Theory. Analysis of Conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1991; 2. Daalgard P., Introductory Statistics with R: Springer, 2008. 3. Maschler, M., E. Solan, S. Zamir, Game Theory. Cambridge University Press 2013. 4. Robert Aumann Lectures on Game Theory, Underground Classics in Economics, Westview Press, Boulder, 1989 5. Binmore, Ken. Playing for Real: A Text on Game Theory, 2007. 6. Krishna, Vijay. Auction theory. Academic press, 2009. 7. Crawford V., J. Sobel, "Strategic Information Transmission", Econometrica, 1982. 8. Kamenica E., M. Gentzkow, "Bayesian Persuasion", American Economic Review, 2011. |
|
| Uwagi: |
Evaluation criteria Traditional Written Exam (written assignment (open questions)): 60.00% Multiple Choice Test: 0.00% Oral Exam: 0.00% Test: 0.00% Other (homeworks - problem sets): 40.00% The threshold percentage of absences (excluding lectures) defined as the proportion of class hours beyond which the achievement of learning outcomes is deemed unattainable: 50% |
|
Zajęcia w cyklu "Semestr letni 2024/25" (zakończony)
| Okres: | 2025-02-15 - 2025-09-30 |
Przejdź do planu
PN WT ŚR CZ WYK
CW
PT |
| Typ zajęć: |
Ćwiczenia, 15 godzin
Wykład, 30 godzin
|
|
| Koordynatorzy: | (brak danych) | |
| Prowadzący grup: | Joanna Franaszek, Łukasz Woźny | |
| Lista studentów: | (nie masz dostępu) | |
| Zaliczenie: |
Przedmiot -
Ocena
Wykład - Ocena |
|
| Skrócony opis: |
See the detailed program. The final program would be a selection of the topics listed. |
|
| Pełny opis: |
The aim of the course is to provide a comprehensive overview of classic and modern game theory. The course is a mix of examples and formal reasoning and would allow to develop both the intuition behind game-theoretic models and the analytical methods used in economics. |
|
| Literatura: |
Literatura podstawowa: 1. M.Osborne, A.Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1994. 2. Fudenberg, D., J. Tirole, Game theory. MIT Press, Cambridge 2002. Literatura uzupełniająca: 1. R.Myerson, Game Theory. Analysis of Conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1991; 2. Daalgard P., Introductory Statistics with R: Springer, 2008. 3. Maschler, M., E. Solan, S. Zamir, Game Theory. Cambridge University Press 2013. 4. Robert Aumann Lectures on Game Theory, Underground Classics in Economics, Westview Press, Boulder, 1989 5. Binmore, Ken. Playing for Real: A Text on Game Theory, 2007. 6. Krishna, Vijay. Auction theory. Academic press, 2009. 7. Crawford V., J. Sobel, "Strategic Information Transmission", Econometrica, 1982. 8. Kamenica E., M. Gentzkow, "Bayesian Persuasion", American Economic Review, 2011. |
|
Zajęcia w cyklu "Semestr zimowy 2024/25" (zakończony)
| Okres: | 2024-10-01 - 2025-02-14 |
Przejdź do planu
PN WT ŚR CZ PT |
| Typ zajęć: |
Ćwiczenia, 15 godzin
Wykład, 30 godzin
|
|
| Koordynatorzy: | (brak danych) | |
| Prowadzący grup: | Joanna Franaszek | |
| Lista studentów: | (nie masz dostępu) | |
| Zaliczenie: |
Przedmiot -
Ocena
Wykład - Ocena |
|
| Skrócony opis: |
See the detailed program. The final program would be a selection of the topics listed. |
|
| Pełny opis: |
The aim of the course is to provide a comprehensive overview of classic and modern game theory. The course is a mix of examples and formal reasoning and would allow to develop both the intuition behind game-theoretic models and the analytical methods used in economics. |
|
| Literatura: |
Literatura podstawowa: 1. M.Osborne, A.Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1994. 2. Fudenberg, D., J. Tirole, Game theory. MIT Press, Cambridge 2002. Literatura uzupełniająca: 1. R.Myerson, Game Theory. Analysis of Conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1991; 2. Daalgard P., Introductory Statistics with R: Springer, 2008. 3. Maschler, M., E. Solan, S. Zamir, Game Theory. Cambridge University Press 2013. 4. Robert Aumann Lectures on Game Theory, Underground Classics in Economics, Westview Press, Boulder, 1989 5. Binmore, Ken. Playing for Real: A Text on Game Theory, 2007. 6. Krishna, Vijay. Auction theory. Academic press, 2009. 7. Crawford V., J. Sobel, "Strategic Information Transmission", Econometrica, 1982. 8. Kamenica E., M. Gentzkow, "Bayesian Persuasion", American Economic Review, 2011. |
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Właścicielem praw autorskich jest Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie.
