Advanced Economics of Contract Law
Informacje ogólne
Kod przedmiotu: | 221251-D |
Kod Erasmus / ISCED: |
14.3
|
Nazwa przedmiotu: | Advanced Economics of Contract Law |
Jednostka: | Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie |
Grupy: | |
Punkty ECTS i inne: |
3.00 (zmienne w czasie)
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Język prowadzenia: | angielski |
Efekty uczenia się: |
Wiedza: Student will get to know the function of contracts in innovative relations. Student will get to know the contract design of venture capitalists. Student will get to know the problems of crowdfunding, and the interaction of incentive schemes and creativity output. Umiejętności: Student will be able to apply the advanced concepts of contract law design. The student can make a critical analysis, interpretation and evaluation of phenomena and processes in the field of advanced economic analysis of contract law. The student can solve problems of crowdfunding and interaction of motivational systems with the results of creativity. Kompetencje społeczne: Student will be able to work in the group. Student understands the democratic societies. |
Zajęcia w cyklu "Semestr letni 2024/25" (jeszcze nie rozpoczęty)
Okres: | 2025-02-15 - 2025-09-30 |
Przejdź do planu
PN WT ŚR CZ PT |
Typ zajęć: |
Konwersatorium, 30 godzin
|
|
Koordynatorzy: | (brak danych) | |
Prowadzący grup: | (brak danych) | |
Lista studentów: | (nie masz dostępu) | |
Zaliczenie: |
Przedmiot -
Ocena
Konwersatorium - Ocena |
|
Skrócony opis: |
Introduction. Hidden Information, Screening and Signaling. Hidden Action, Moral Hazard. Disclosure of Public Certifiable Information. Multidimensional Incentive Problems. Multilateral Asymmetric Information: Bilateral Trading and Auctions. Multiagent Moral Hazard and Cullusion. Dynamic Adverse Selection. Dynamic Moral Hazard. Incomplete Contracts and Institution Design. Foundations of Contracting with Unverifiable Information. Markets and Contracts. Exercises. |
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Pełny opis: |
This course discusses advanced topics in contract law and economics with a focus on contexts of innovation and creativity. Through the lens of principal-agent-theory, we examine topics such as the function of contracts in innovative relations, contract design of venture capitalists, problems of crowdfunding, and the interaction of incentive schemes and creativity output. A sound understanding of basic game-theoretic concepts of economic theory of contracts is a strongly suggested prerequisite for this course. While economic theory will be the methodological focus, the course accounts for insights from behavioral and experimental economics where appropriate. |
|
Literatura: |
Literatura podstawowa: 1. Schaefer H., Ott C., The Economic Analysis of Contract Law, Edwar Elgar, 2004; 2. Posner R., Economic Analysis of Law, Boston, Little Brown, 1992; 3. Kronman A., Posner R., The Economics of Contract Law, Boston, Little Brown, 1979. Literatura uzupełniająca: ... |
|
Uwagi: |
Kryteria oceniania: egzamin tradycyjny-pisemny: 100.00% |
Zajęcia w cyklu "Semestr zimowy 2024/25" (w trakcie)
Okres: | 2024-10-01 - 2025-02-14 |
Przejdź do planu
PN WT ŚR CZ PT |
Typ zajęć: |
Konwersatorium, 30 godzin
|
|
Koordynatorzy: | (brak danych) | |
Prowadzący grup: | (brak danych) | |
Lista studentów: | (nie masz dostępu) | |
Zaliczenie: |
Przedmiot -
Ocena
Konwersatorium - Ocena |
|
Skrócony opis: |
Introduction. Hidden Information, Screening and Signaling. Hidden Action, Moral Hazard. Disclosure of Public Certifiable Information. Multidimensional Incentive Problems. Multilateral Asymmetric Information: Bilateral Trading and Auctions. Multiagent Moral Hazard and Cullusion. Dynamic Adverse Selection. Dynamic Moral Hazard. Incomplete Contracts and Institution Design. Foundations of Contracting with Unverifiable Information. Markets and Contracts. Exercises. |
|
Pełny opis: |
This course discusses advanced topics in contract law and economics with a focus on contexts of innovation and creativity. Through the lens of principal-agent-theory, we examine topics such as the function of contracts in innovative relations, contract design of venture capitalists, problems of crowdfunding, and the interaction of incentive schemes and creativity output. A sound understanding of basic game-theoretic concepts of economic theory of contracts is a strongly suggested prerequisite for this course. While economic theory will be the methodological focus, the course accounts for insights from behavioral and experimental economics where appropriate. |
|
Literatura: |
Literatura podstawowa: 1. Schaefer H., Ott C., The Economic Analysis of Contract Law, Edwar Elgar, 2004; 2. Posner R., Economic Analysis of Law, Boston, Little Brown, 1992; 3. Kronman A., Posner R., The Economics of Contract Law, Boston, Little Brown, 1979. Literatura uzupełniająca: ... |
|
Uwagi: |
Kryteria oceniania: egzamin tradycyjny-pisemny: 100.00% |
Zajęcia w cyklu "Semestr letni 2023/24" (zakończony)
Okres: | 2024-02-24 - 2024-09-30 |
Przejdź do planu
PN WT ŚR CZ PT |
Typ zajęć: |
Konwersatorium, 30 godzin
|
|
Koordynatorzy: | (brak danych) | |
Prowadzący grup: | (brak danych) | |
Lista studentów: | (nie masz dostępu) | |
Zaliczenie: |
Przedmiot -
Ocena
Konwersatorium - Ocena |
|
Skrócony opis: |
Introduction. Hidden Information, Screening and Signaling. Hidden Action, Moral Hazard. Disclosure of Public Certifiable Information. Multidimensional Incentive Problems. Multilateral Asymmetric Information: Bilateral Trading and Auctions. Multiagent Moral Hazard and Cullusion. Dynamic Adverse Selection. Dynamic Moral Hazard. Incomplete Contracts and Institution Design. Foundations of Contracting with Unverifiable Information. Markets and Contracts. Exercises. |
|
Pełny opis: |
This course discusses advanced topics in contract law and economics with a focus on contexts of innovation and creativity. Through the lens of principal-agent-theory, we examine topics such as the function of contracts in innovative relations, contract design of venture capitalists, problems of crowdfunding, and the interaction of incentive schemes and creativity output. A sound understanding of basic game-theoretic concepts of economic theory of contracts is a strongly suggested prerequisite for this course. While economic theory will be the methodological focus, the course accounts for insights from behavioral and experimental economics where appropriate. |
|
Literatura: |
Literatura podstawowa: 1. Schaefer H., Ott C., The Economic Analysis of Contract Law, Edwar Elgar, 2004; 2. Posner R., Economic Analysis of Law, Boston, Little Brown, 1992; 3. Kronman A., Posner R., The Economics of Contract Law, Boston, Little Brown, 1979. Literatura uzupełniająca: ... |
|
Uwagi: |
Kryteria oceniania: egzamin tradycyjny-pisemny: 100.00% |
Zajęcia w cyklu "Semestr zimowy 2023/24" (zakończony)
Okres: | 2023-10-01 - 2024-02-23 |
Przejdź do planu
PN WT ŚR CZ PT |
Typ zajęć: |
Konwersatorium, 30 godzin
|
|
Koordynatorzy: | (brak danych) | |
Prowadzący grup: | (brak danych) | |
Lista studentów: | (nie masz dostępu) | |
Zaliczenie: |
Przedmiot -
Ocena
Konwersatorium - Ocena |
|
Skrócony opis: |
Introduction. Hidden Information, Screening and Signaling. Hidden Action, Moral Hazard. Disclosure of Public Certifiable Information. Multidimensional Incentive Problems. Multilateral Asymmetric Information: Bilateral Trading and Auctions. Multiagent Moral Hazard and Cullusion. Dynamic Adverse Selection. Dynamic Moral Hazard. Incomplete Contracts and Institution Design. Foundations of Contracting with Unverifiable Information. Markets and Contracts. Exercises. |
|
Pełny opis: |
This course discusses advanced topics in contract law and economics with a focus on contexts of innovation and creativity. Through the lens of principal-agent-theory, we examine topics such as the function of contracts in innovative relations, contract design of venture capitalists, problems of crowdfunding, and the interaction of incentive schemes and creativity output. A sound understanding of basic game-theoretic concepts of economic theory of contracts is a strongly suggested prerequisite for this course. While economic theory will be the methodological focus, the course accounts for insights from behavioral and experimental economics where appropriate. |
|
Literatura: |
Literatura podstawowa: 1. Schaefer H., Ott C., The Economic Analysis of Contract Law, Edwar Elgar, 2004; 2. Posner R., Economic Analysis of Law, Boston, Little Brown, 1992; 3. Kronman A., Posner R., The Economics of Contract Law, Boston, Little Brown, 1979. Literatura uzupełniająca: ... |
|
Uwagi: |
Kryteria oceniania: egzamin tradycyjny-pisemny: 100.00% |
Właścicielem praw autorskich jest Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie.